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IMPACT OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
ON THE LAW OF THE COLORADO RIVER
GARY D. WEATHERFORD* and GORDON C. JACOBY**
INTRODUCTION
For several million years the Colorado River flowed free of human
constraints. It was viewed as a "natural menace"' well into this
century. In less than a human lifetime, the river has become com-
prehensively and commercially developed-dammed, desilted, and
diverted-to irrigate crops, produce power, and water distant cities.
Each stage of development has been authorized or supported by
laws. Historically, the laws have reflected multiple purposes, but the
objective of reclaiming arid and semi-arid land for agricultural use-
the reclamation ethic-has been paramount. Property rights to use
the water have become legally vested pursuant to those laws. The
limited supply of cheap and regulated surface water in the basin is
over subscribed in the sense that it has become, variously, covered by
vested water rights (or water right applications), contractually com-
mitted, officially reserved, unofficially projected for designated
potential uses, and progressively degraded in quality.
Profound changes are now occurring in the Colorado River Basin.
New societal demands for water are on a collision course with vested
legal rights and past commitments. Mammoth economic forces are
converging to exploit fossil fuels in the Colorado River Basin and the
North Central States Region for energy consumers in the western
two-thirds of the nation.
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1. The mission of the Federal Government for many years was to convert the "natural
menace" into a "national resource." So said the subtitle to the major report, U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, The Colorado River (1946).
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In the 1955-1965 decade, thermal electricity passed irrigation as
the single most prolific withdrawer of water in the nation.2 With-
drawal constitutes the total amount diverted or pumped. In a once-
through cooling system for a fossil-fueled power plant only about 1 /2
to 2 percent of the withdrawal is consumptively used. By compar-
ison, a much higher percentage is consumptively used in irrigation.
On the average, the coal-fired plants consume 15 acre-feet of water
per megawatt per year.' Nuclear power plants, which may follow on
the heels of the fossil fuel plants, consume approximately 22 acre-
feet per megawatt per year under current technology.4
In January 1974, the Western Systems Coordinating Council pro-
jected an addition of 25,161 megawatts in coal-fired generating
capacity during the decade ending in 1983 for the 13 western states
and British Columbia.' As of July 1974, the six large coal-fired
thermal electric power plants which were operational or under con-
struction in the Upper Colorado River Basin involved some 8,450
megawatts of capacity. 6 The total consumptive water use for that
capacity will be about 125,000 acre-feet per year.7 Planned and
projected units and plants in the Upper Basin could add another
25,000 megawatts of electricity, consuming approximately 351,000
acre-feet more of water per year.8 Planned and projected oil shale
plants and coal-gasification facilities reportedly could require another
388,000 acre-feet of Upper Basin water each year.9
The Bureau of Reclamation recently estimated that something in
the order of 874,000 acre-feet more water will be needed annually in
the Upper Basin by the turn of the century to supply coal-fired
steam plants, coal-gasification facilities, and oil shale development.' 0
Although energy-related development within the Lower Colorado
River Basin drainage area, removed as it is from most of the larger
significant coal deposits, can be expected to accelerate more slowly
than the Upper Basin, several new coal-fired and nuclear plants are
projected for the next decade.' 1
2. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Water Demands for Expanding Energy Development 5-6
(GS Circular 703, 1974).
3. Id. at 8 n. 1.
4. Id.
5. Western Systems Coordinating Council, Ten Year Coordinated Plan Summary,
1974-1983, at 9, Table 3 (1974).
6. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Report on Water for Energy in the Upper Colorado River
Basin 40, Table 11 (1974).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 40.
10. Id. at 42.
11. See Western Systems Coordinating Council, supra note 5, at 26-31.
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Several words of caution are in order about the current projections
of massive water demand for energy development.
First, energy development is only one source, among many, of
rising water demand in the Colorado River Basin. Claims for greater
shares of the flow are being asserted on behalf of Indians, fish and
wildlife, mining interests, recreationists, and environmentalists. Given
the multiple-demand picture, it would be an oversimplification to
view increased energy demand as the sole variable likely to create
pressure points in the law of the river. Any one of several emergent
demands could be the critical factor precipitating a particular
"crunch" or "crisis" in the future. Obviously, some of the demands
are interdependent and all of the demands can act collectively to
place strains on the legal framework governing the management of
the river. Energy development simply happens to be the most prom-
inent, rapidly changing, nonagricultural variable at this point in the
history of water demand in the basin. The kind of impact it will have
on the legal system may be illustrative of the kinds of impacts other
water demand variables can be expected to cause over time.
Second, large-scale water use for the production of electrical
energy may not be a permanent fixture. The water demand asso-
ciated with coal-fired power plants, which commonly are built with a
35-year amortization and plant-life period in mind, will be termin-
able. Under some contractual arrangements, the water will auto-
matically revert to nonenergy uses upon the death of the power
plant. Many fossil fuel plants could be replaced by nuclear plants, of
course, which consume even more cooling water per unit of power
produced. Direct conversion of solar to electric energy, or some
other means of energy production which needs little water, may
preempt or ultimately supplant fossil fuel or nuclear power genera-
tion, however. And, because the coal reserves are exhaustible, the
gasification and liquefaction of coal will be ephemeral. At some fu-
ture date, then, the use of water for food and fiber production could
become a "higher" economic use than any energy-related use of
water.
Finally, projections of future water demand for energy-or for any
other use-are highly speculative. Water demand, as well as supply,
defies precise prediction. The variables surrounding demand can
change and commonly evade prospective quantification. Every
generation would probably do well to avoid precipitous and inflex-
ible responses to what are characterized as emergent and inevitable
water demands.
With the foregoing qualifications made, the fact remains that
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energy-related demands for water are mounting quickly in the Colo-
rado River Basin. Although the rural reclamation ethic has been able
to accommodate a measure of municipal-industrial water and power
demand in the past,' 2 the divergent, water-related demands of
urban populations now have grown to a point where accommodation
is becoming more difficult. The urban-based "environmentalist" and
"recreationist" demands clean water. The urban "voter" demands
that limits be put on subsidies for agricultural development (while
insisting upon low food prices). The urban "consumer" sustains a
high-energy lifestyle which sends the electric utilities to the banks of
the Colorado in search of powerplant sites. These often times incon-
sistent demands add up to an urban assault of major proportions on
the rural reclamation ethic.
With this crunch between urban and rural water demand comes
the question: Is the "law of the river" flexible enough to moderate
these competing forces in the public interest? If so, how will the
process work? This article attempts to answer those questions in
general terms only. Since water supply is variable and the extent,
rate, and location of the future demands for water in the basin are a
matter of conjecture, it is impossible to identify all of the possible
pressure points which could arise in the laws governing management
of the river. We deal here with some of the more obvious problems,
hoping that other students of the subject will add to the literature as
the pace of new water demand quickens and the trends become more
discernible.
PRESENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Since the laws governing the Colorado River system have been
superbly analyzed in detail elsewhere,' ' only a brief summary of the
major legal provisions is offered here. The "law of the river" is
actually a composite of many laws-an accumulation of statutes,
compacts, court decisions, contracts, regulations, and administrative
rulings.
A. Levels of Legal Allocation in the Colorado River Basin
Generally speaking, the flow of the Colorado River is divided
among users on the basis of beneficial consumptive use. What is
apportioned are rights to consume certain amounts of water for
purposes recognized to be beneficial under the law. These rights to
12. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1971); see also, Sax, Federal Reclamation Law, in 2
Waters and Water Rights, 246-255 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
13. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1966).
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deplete the flow of the system are allotted pursuant to formulae,
criteria, and priorities embodied in numerous laws.
The allocation system for the Colorado River and its tributaries
operates at four levels: international, interregional, interstate, and
intrastate. At the international level, the use of the river has been
divided between the United States and Mexico by treaty. On the
broadest domestic level, the beneficial utility has been both reserved
to an uncertain extent for Indian and federal uses and apportioned
between two interstate regions, the Upper Basin and the Lower
Basin. The reservation of water occurred in connection with the
creation of Indian and federal reservations variously by treaty, execu-
tive order and act of Congress. The interregional allocation was
accomplished by interstate compact and act of Congress. At the next
level of generality, the beneficial utility has been apportioned among
the States. This has been achieved by a mix of laws, including an
interstate compact in the Upper Basin and interstate litigation in the
Lower Basin. The lowest level of generality is that of intrastate allo-
cation, which has resulted from appropriations being made and water
rights being perfected under state laws, both within and outside the
contractual scheme of federal reclamation projects.
1. International Allocation
A formal division of water between the upstream riparian and
downstream riparian nations was accomplished in the Mexican Water
Treaty of 1944.1 ' Mexico was guaranteed an annual amount of 1.5
million acre-feet (m.a.f.), except in times of extreme shortage." s The
treaty contained no express provision for water quality,' 6 although
continued agricultural use of the water in Mexico was clearly con-
templated.' ' The issue of water quality came to the fore in 1961
when highly saline groundwater from the Wellton-Mohawk District in
Arizona was pumped into the river above the Mexican delivery point.
Negotiations resulted in a 1965 joint agreement' 8 supplementing the
14. Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945)
[hereinafter cited as Water Treaty of 19441.
15. Id. art. 10.
16. According to E. Weinberg, "Salt Talks" United States and Mexico Style 48, May 23,
1973 (draft of a case study to appear in a publication of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law tenatively entitled International Responsibility for Environmental Quality):
It is impossible to escape the conclusion, when examining the record of the
negotiations of the 1944 water treaty, that the parties feared that if they had
had to deal explicitly with the issue of water quality, the treaty would not
have materialized.
17. Water Treaty of 1944, art. 27.
18. Minute No. 218, 4 Int'l Legal Materials 545 (1965), 55 Dep't State Bull. 555 (1965).
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treaty and requiring the drainage waters to be periodically bypassed
below the Mexican diversion point. This joint agreement was super-
seded by a new joint agreement in 1972,1 9 which called for higher-
quality water to be substituted for the drainage water delivered to
Mexico. On June 24, 1974, President Nixon signed the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act,2 0 authorizing the construction of a
desalting plant and other works to improve the quality of the water
crossing the border. The obligation to Mexico is becoming primarily
a matter of Federal responsibility.2 1
2. Interregional Allocation and Management
(a) 1922 Colorado River Compact
Sectional rivalry caused the drainage basin of the Colorado River
system to be divided into two allocation areas, the Upper Basin
(composed of the "upper division" states of Colorado, New Mexico,
Utah and Wyoming, as well as a portion of Arizona) and the Lower
Basin (composed of the "lower division" states of Arizona, California
and Nevada).
Headwater regions, called "areas of origin," commonly develop
more slowly than the fertile lowland valleys. In order to prevent
downriver users from acquiring a disproportionate share of the water
rights, users in areas of origin have come to insist that rights to some
of the water flow be reserved for their future benefit.2 2 In essence,
that was what the states in the Upper Basin achieved when Con-
gressional approval of the 1922 Colorado River Compact became
effective in 1929.23
The compact, as adopted by Congress, purported to give each
basin a perpetual right to the "exclusive beneficial use of 7,500,000
19. Minute No. 241, 67 Dep't State Bull. 198 (1972).
20. Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974).
21. Congress declared the Mexican treaty terms to be a "national obligation" in 1968. If
and when the river is augmented by an adequate supply, the upper and lower division states
are to be relieved from any water delivery obligations they assumed in Article 111(c) of the
1922 Colorado River Compact. See Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1512
(1971). For an historical review of the salinity problem with Mexico, see Brownell, Report
of the President's Special Representative For Resolution of the Colorado River Salinity
Problem with Mexico, December 28, 1972, in S. Rep. No. 93-906, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974).
22. See Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversion, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1299, 1308-1331 (1968).
23. Congress approved the Compact in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617
(1) (1971), and provided that it could become effective when California and at least five of
the other basin states approved it. The Project Act and Compact became effective by
presidential proclamation on June 25, 1929, 46 Stat. 3000.
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acre-feet of water per annum ... "24 Such an equal division may
never occur, however, because the Lower Basin negotiators hedged
their bet. Although the river had produced an average flow for the
two decades preceding 1922 that would have comfortably accom-
modated 7.5 m.a.f. in beneficial consumptive uses annually for each
half of the basin, the hydrological risk remained that a dryer cycle
might someday occur, preventing the river from supporting that level
of use throughout the basin. Who should bear such a deficiency? One
possibility would be to proration the deficiency evenly between the
Upper and Lower Basins. Another approach would be to require one
of the basins to assume all or a disproportionate share of the defi-
ciency. The latter approach was adopted, with the Upper Basin
assuming the burden.
The Lower Basin was assured that depletions in the Upper Basin
would not prevent at least 75 m.a.f. of aggregate flow in each succes-
sive ten-year period from reaching the Lower Basin at Lee Ferry.2
The Lower Basin received a guaranteed ten-year, not annual,
2 6
minimum flow. The Upper Basin became a guarantor in the sense
that its depletions may not reduce the ten-year aggregate flow below
the 75 m.a.f. figure.
The 1922 Compact apportionment formula does not apply to
those groundwater resources within the basin which are hydro-
logically unrelated to the Colorado River system.
(b) Operating Criteria Under 1968 Colorado River Basin Act
The apportionment of the variable river flow between the Upper
and Lower Basins became a challenge in the 1960's, particularly with
the construction and filling of new storage reservoirs in the Upper
Basin.2 In the Colorado River Basin Act of 196828 Congress in-
24. Colorado River Compact, art. III (a), November 24, 1922, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325
(1928).
25. Id. art 111(d), provides: "The States of the upper division will not cause the flow of
the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any
period of 10 consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with the
first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact."
26. Use of the modifier, "aggregate," in Article Ill(d) strongly suggests, of course, that
deliveries of less than 7.5 m.a.f. to the Lower Basin during a given year would be permis-
sible as long as the 10-year cumulative flow was 75 m.a.f. Also, extrinsic evidence reveals
that the inclusion of specific language guaranteeing a minimum annual flow was considered
but finally rejected by the Compact negotiators. An earlier version of Article Ill(d) con-
tained the phrase, "not below a flow of 4,000,000 acre-feet for any one of such years,"
which was later deleted by the Compact Commission. See Olson, The Colorado River
Compact (1926), Appendix II, Exhibit A.
27. Four storage units (Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Curecanti and Navajo) were con-
structed under authority of the Colorado River Storage Project, 43 U.S.C. § § 620-620 o
(1971). In the first full-water year after Glen Canyon Dam was closed, 1964, approximately
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structed the Secretary of the Interior to develop and adopt "criteria
for the coordinated long-range operation" of the federal reservoirs in
the Colorado River System.2 9 Congress specified the priorities by
which water was to be released from Lake Powell above the Lee
Ferry accounting point. The treaty obligation to Mexico, the Upper
Basin guarantee of 75 m.a.f. per decade, and carryover storage neces-
sary to meet those foregoing obligations, were to be given preference
in that order. Guidelines for maintaining parity in the active storage
between Lake Mead and Lake Powell were also mandated. The Secre-
tary of the Interior promulgated detailed criteria in 1970. 0 The
actual experience under these legal guidelines is described annually in
a departmental report. 3'
3. Interstate and Tribal Allocation
(a) Statutory Apportionment Among the Lower Division States
Congress, whether it fully appreciated it then or not, apportioned
the consumptive use of the river among the lower division states
through the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928. According to the
majority opinion in Arizona v. California,
Congress decided that a fair division of the first 7,500,000 acre-feet
of such mainstream waters would give 4,400,000 acre-feet to Cal-
ifornia, 2,800,000 to Arizona, and 300,000 to Nevada; Arizona and
California would each get one-half of any surplus. *** Division of
the water did not ... depend on the States' agreeing to a compact,
for Congress gave the Secretary of the Interior adequate authority to
accomplish the division. Congress did this by giving the Secretary
power to make contracts for the delivery of water and by providing
that no person could have water without a contract. 
3 2
5,663,000 acre-feet was retained, with only 2,414,000 acre-feet released from the dam. The
comparable figures for 1965 were 4,931,000 acre-feet and 10,820,000 acre-feet. These
estimates were computed from figures appearing in unpublished tables, Reconstructed Flow
Studies, Lake Powell, provided to the Lake Powell Research Project by staff of Region IV,
Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, on October 16, 1972. The authority of the Secretary
of the Interior to reduce Lower Basin deliveries by 10 percent to facilitate the filling of Glen
Canyon Dam was upheld in Yuma County Water Users' Association v. Udall, 253 F. Supp.
909 (D.C. 1968). Notwithstanding the low release in 1964, the ten-year period ending in
1973 ended with in excess of 75 m.a.f. delivered at Lee Ferry; 82.9 m.a.f. had been
delivered by the end of the 1973 water year. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Annual Report,
1973 Operation of the Colorado River Basin, 1974 Projected Operations 20 (1974).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1971).
29. I § 1552.
30. See Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs
Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin Project Act of September 30, 1968 (P.L. 90-537), in
Upper Colorado River Comm'n, Twenty-Second Annual Report, Appendix C (1970).
31. E.g., U.S. Dep't of the Interior Annual Report, 1973 Operation of the Colorado
River Basin,. 1974 Projected Operations (1974).
32. 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963).
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California had sought to have the Court allocate the flow under the
doctrine of equitable apportionment, whereby priority could be
given to the early appropriations of California users.3 3 California
regained some lost ground in 1968 when Congress gave the state's
water-right holders a priority, to the extent of the 4.4 m.a.f., over
the Central Arizona Project in the event of shortage.3
(b) Compact Apportionment Among Upper Division States
The upper division states, unlike the lower, avoided litigation and
reached agreement on a formula for apportioning rights to the flow
in their half of the basin. The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
of 1948 allots to Arizona 50,000 acre-feet per annum and, as to the
balance of the annual consumptive use available to to the Upper
Basin, apportions to Colorado, 51.75 percent; New Mexico, 11.25
percent; Utah, 23 percent; and Wyoming, 14 percent.3 The gross
amount of annual consumptive use allowable in the Upper Basin,
against which these percentages apply, has become less than 7.5
m.a.f. with the downward revision of estimates of average river flow.
Water available for Upper Basin consumptive use is now projected to
be from 5.25 to 5.8 m.a.f., as discussed below.
(c) Reserved Rights for Indian Tribes
Indian tribes, regarded as quasi-sovereigns under the law, nonethe-
less were not parties to either the interregional allocation of the 1922
Compact or the interstate allocation of the 1948 Compact. Each of
the compacts contains a negative declaration to the effect that Indian
rights are outside the reach of the interstate accord. 3 6
33. Id. at 563.
34. The decree in Arizona v. California
shall be so administered that in any year in which [the Secretary of the
Interior determines] there is insufficient mainstream Colorado River water
available for release to satisfy annual consumptive use of seven million five
hundred thousand acre-feet in Arizona, California, and Nevada, diversions
from the main stream for the Central Arizona Project shall be so limited as to
assure the availability of water in quantities sufficient to provide for the
aggregate annual consumptive use by holders of present perfected rights, by
other users in the State of California served under existing contracts with the
United States by diversion works heretofore constructed, and by other
existing Federal reservations in that State, of four million four hundred
thousand acre-feet of mainstream water, and by users of the same character in
Arizona and Nevada.
Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1521 (b) (1971).
35. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, October 11, 1948 (approved by Congress
April 6, 1949), art. III (a), 63 Stat. 31, 32 (1949).
36. "Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the
United States of America to Indian tribes." Colorado River Compact, art. VII, 70 Cong.
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Tribal water claims are based on the Winters doctrine, which holds
that the right to use water is reserved as an incident of reservation
land.' I Since, unlike most water rights, the Winters right is not lost
by non-use, it can persist indefinitely in an unquantified state. Some
of the Indian water rights have been quantified (either by adjudica-
tion or agreement); some have not. While the apportionment of con-
sumptive use rights to Native Americans throughout the basin defies
quantification at this time, some tribal rights have been numerically
defined.
The reserved rights of five tribes in the Lower Basin were adjudi-
cated and quantified, totaling some 1 m.a.f. per annum, in the latest
Arizona v. California litigation.3 8
Tribal rights in the Upper Basin are at various stages of develop-
ment. The Navajo Tribe agreed to share shortages in the San Juan
River system and to accept a right to an average annual diversion of
508,000 acre-feet to irrigate a projected 110,630 acres in the Navajo
Indian Irrigation Project 9.3  The Navajos also adopted a resolution
allowing 34,000 acre-feet of Arizona's 50,000 acre-foot entitlement
in the Upper Basin to be used as cooling water for many years at the
Navajo Generating Station. 0 An adjudication of Southern Ute and
Ute-Mountain Ute rights on several San Juan River tributaries is
pending.4  The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reserva-
tion has reserved water rights, some of which allegedly are recognized
by contract. 2
Rec. 325 (1928). The same language appears in the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,
art. XIX (a), 63 Stat. at 42.
37. See generally, M. Price, Law and the American Indian, 310-329 (1973); National
Water Comm'n, Water Policies for the Future 473-483 (1973); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908); and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
38. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (the lesser of either 11,340 acre-feet diversion or
water to irrigate 1,900 acres); Cocopah Indian Reservation (the lesser of either 2,744 acre-
feet diversion or water to irrigate 431 acres); Yuma Indian Reservation (the lesser of either
51,616 acre-feet diversion or water to irrigate 7,743 acres); Colorado River Indian Reserva-
tion (the lesser of either 717,148 acre-feet diversion or water to irrigate 107,588 acres); and
Fort Mohave Indian Reservation (the lesser of either 122,648 acre-feet diversion or water to
irrigate 18,974 acres). Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344 (1964) (decree).
39. See Act of June 13, 1962, 43 U.S.C. § 615ss (1971); see also, Navajo Tribal Council
Resolution CD-86-57, December 12, 1957.
40. Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CD-108-68, December 11, 1968.
41. United States v. Akin, Civil No. C-4497 (D. Colo. filed Nov. 14, 1972). The action
was dismissed by the District Court on the grounds of abstention and comity, in recognition
of similar state-court action. On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded,
504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
42. See, Brief, Ute Indian Tribe, Amicus Curiae, Sierra Club v. Stamm, Civil No. C-74-9
(D. Utah, filed Jan. 7, 1974); Indian Deferral Agreement of September 20, 1965 (Contract
No. 14-06-W-194, Bureau of Reclamation), covering the Upper Duchesne River and Rock
Creek; Colorado River Storage Project, 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1971).
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Indian water rights are becoming an increasingly important vari-
able in the planning and management of the river system.
4. Intrastate Allocation
The beneficial consumptive use of water has been allocated within
each basin state through the creation and recognition of water rights.
The water rights have arisen in a number of ways, depending on the
time period and jurisdiction involved.4
The typical allocation scheme for irrigated agriculture within
federal projects involves two levels of contracts plus the perfection of
the water right by actual appropriation and beneficial use. The
United States enters into a contract with an irrigation district, where-
in the former agrees to deliver water and the latter agrees to assume
the burden of capital repayment, as well as operation and main-
tenance costs.4 The district then contracts with the water user who
acquires a water right by putting the water to beneficial use in ac-
cordance with state law.4 I
Industrial users increasingly are contracting directly with the
Bureau of Reclamation for water, while concurrently applying for
water use permits with the appropriate state water agency.
Whatever the source of the water right, or the sequence followed
in establishing it, the related consumptive use is charged against the
entitlement of the basin state where the use occurs.4 6
B. Influence of National Policies and Controls
The law of the river cannot be viewed simply as a regional water
allocation scheme. A more generic class of federal laws which repre-
sent broad national policies concerning water resource development
and management, are also embodied in the law of the river. The law
of the river contains not only the traditional national reclamation
laws, for example, but also the new incentives, sanctions and controls
of such legislation as the Water Resources Planning Act, National
Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, all noted infra. The integration of new
national laws and policies into the law of the river is an ongoing
process in the Colorado River Basin, as it is in other river basins.
43. See generally, I. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States (1971);
R. Dewsnup, D. Jensen, & R. Swenson, A Summary-Digest of State Water Laws (1973).
44. See generally Sax, The Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 Waters and Water Rights 111
(R. Clark ed. 1967).
45. See Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
46. Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963), and the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, arts. III & VII, 63 Stat. at 32, 35.
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HYDROLOGIC PARAMETERS AND PROSPECTS4 7
A. Surface Water Supply in the Basin
The entire Colorado River Basin has an area of 243,000 square
miles. It is estimated that the average annual virgin flow of the Colo-
rado River Basin is about the same as that of the Delaware River
Basin which is only about 1/20th of the areal size.4 8 With the ex-
ception of the deserts of the Great Basin, the Colorado River Basin
has the greatest water deficiency of any basin in the coterminous
United States (water deficiency determined by average precipitation
less potential evapotranspiration). 4 9 Yet, more water is exported
from the Colorado River Basin than from any other river basin in the
United States.' 0
About 83 percent of the water which flows in the Colorado River
Basin comes from the Upper Basin.' ' The Upper Basin area is 109,000
square miles. The average annual precipitation throughout the entire
Upper Basin is about 16 inches,5 2 providing a renewable input to the
Upper Basin averaging about 93,440,000 acre-feet per year. This
input, however, only yields about 13,500,000 acre-feet per year of
virgin surface-runoff.5 ' The remainder is lost by evapotranspiration
within the Upper Basin.
During the winter season from October through April the precip-
itable moisture is brought in mostly by maritime air masses from the
Pacific Ocean. During the other months of the year a large part of
the precipitable moisture brought to the basin originates in the Gulf
47. The authors recognize that there is a partially integrated surface and ground-water
system in the Colorado River Basin. However, the law of the river neglects ground water for
the most part. See Meyers, supra note 13, at 26. Therefore, this discussion is limited to
surface-water parameters and prospects. The development of those ground-water resources
of the basin -which are not hydrologically related to the surface water may relieve some of
the pressure on surface-water supplies. On the other hand, the recharge rate of most ground
water sources in the basin is relatively slow and extensive use may deplete the ground-water
supplies at a nonreplenishable rate.
48. Committee on Water, National Research Council, Water and Choice in the Colorado
River Basin 8 (1968).
49. Piper, Has the United States Enough Water? 11 (U.S.G.S. Water-Supply Paper 1797,
1965).
50. Committee on Water, supra note 48, at 5.
51. Lower Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group for the Pacific Southwest
Interagency Committee, Lower Colorado Region Comprehensive Framework Study,
Appendix V, at 11-13 (1970).
52. lorns, Hembree & Oakland, Water Resources of the Upper Colorado River Basin-
Technical Report 10 (U.S. G. S. Prof. Paper 441, 1965).
53. This estimate was developed by the Hydrology Subproject of the Lake Powell Re-
search Project which is an NSF-sponsored consortium of universities and institutions study-
ing the impact of man's activities in the Lake Powell region. The estimate is based on
research primarily conducted at the Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research in Tucson, Arizona,
by Dr. Charles W. Stockton.
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of Mexico. The winter precipitation accumulates in the higher moun-
tain regions as a winter snowpack and provides most of the surface
runoff in the basin during the spring melt and runoff period. It is this
winter precipitation regime that is receiving the most attention in
weather modification studies in the Upper Basin.' ' The seeding of
some of the winter storms to stimulate greater amounts of precipita-
tion is termed "winter orographic snowpack augmentation." The
term "orographic snowpack" refers to the effect of high altitude on
precipitation. It has been recently estimated that 0.9 to 1.3 m.a.f.
could be added by this method to the natural flow of the river.' I
The moisture brought up from the Gulf of Mexico generally pre-
cipitates as summer storms throughout the basin area. In the Upper
Basin, most of the precipitation occurs during the October through
April period. In much of the Lower Basin, the summer storms pro-
vide the major portion of precipitation.
The evaporation rates vary greatly throughout the entire basin,
from approximately 30 inches 6 in the northern, higher portions of
the basin to about 86 inches s ' in the extreme southern portions of
the basin.
Estimates have been made of the virgin runoff for the Upper Basin
going back to 1896. The runoff for the Upper Basin has actually
been recorded since January 1923. 8 Table 1 indicates the estimated
TABLE 1
Estimates of Average Virgin Flow for the Upper Colorado River Basin
Period Million Acre-Feet Per Year
1896-1968 14.82
1906-1965 15.09
1914-1965 14.64
1922-1965 13.87
1931-1965 13.09
1931-1968 13.01*
*1966-1968 estimated from graph.
Source: Lower Colorado Region Comprehensive Framework Study, Appendix V, Water
Resources, V-12 (1970).
54. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 1972 Project Skywater Annual
Report 15-121 (1973).
55. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 6, at 58.
56. Upper Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group for the Pacific Southwest
Interagency Committee, Upper Colorado Region Comprehensive Framework Study,
Appendix V, at 12 (1971).
57. Lower Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group, supra note 51, at 9.
58. U.S. Geological Survey, Compilation of Records of Surface Waters of the United
States through September, 1950, Part 9, Colorado River Basin (Water-Supply Paper 1313,
1954).
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average virgin flow for the Upper Colorado River Basin during dif-
ferent time periods. Depending upon the time period selected, the
streamflow from the Upper Basin varies from 13.01 to 15.09 m.a.f.
per year.
The hydrology studies of the Lake Powell Research Project esti-
mate that the reconstructed virgin runoff from the Upper Colorado
River Basin for the past four centuries would have a mean of about
13.5 m.a.f. per year. The flow figures from 1896 to 1922 in Table 1
are based on data from other locations, and these measurements were
used to make estimates of what the flow would have been at the
1922 Compact accounting point at Lee Ferry. From 1923 to the
present there has been stream gage information from the Colorado
River and Paria River that can be summed to provide data for the
accounting point. One common factor that produces some uncer-
tainty in all of these figures is the determination of consumptive use
within the Upper Basin which must be added back to the early
estimated and later gauged data to provide the reconstructed virgin
flow at the accounting point.
In the Lake Powell Research Project studies, dendrochronology
techniques were used in correlating tree-ring width series from Upper
Basin sites with reconstructed virgin outflow data provided by
federal agencies. This information was then used to extrapolate virgin
runoff from the Upper Basin back to the year 1570.1 9 This proce-
dure placed the measured and previously estimated information in a
broader historical context and the results indicated that the early
decades of the 20th Century were one of the wettest periods in over
400 years. The study showed that since 1930 we probably have been
in a more normal precipitation and runoff period in contrast to the
abnormally wet period during the early part of this century. The
estimate of a reconstructed virgin outflow of 14.9 m.a.f. per year
used by the Bureau of Reclamation is based on data for the
1906-1973 interval.6 0 The period covered by measured data largely
coincides with the more normal precipitation and runoff period. The
difference between this figure of 14.9 m.a.f. per year and the Lake
Powell Research Project figure of 13.5 m.a.f. per year is significant.
However, both of these current estimates of available surface-water
supply within the Upper Colorado River Basin are considerably less
59. The Hydrology Subproject of the Lake Powell Research Project is currently prepar-
ing a technical bulletin to fully describe the methods, data, and results of its Upper Basin
streamflow-trends study based on dendrochronology.
60. Communication with Don Barnett of the Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado
Region, Salt Lake City, September 23, 1974.
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than those existing at the time the Colorado River Compact was
negotiated and some of the early legislation was enacted.
There are distinct uncertainties in the hydrologic data for the
basin. Rain and snow gauges in the basin provide an extremely small
sample in relation to the total area of the basin. A study of the
atmospheric water balance indicated "that the basin precipitation as
determined from rain gauges is about 50 percent less than that ob-
tained from the atmospheric water balance." 6 1 The difference was
largely attributed to a lack of high-altitude sampling in the precipita-
tion gauge system. High-altitude sampling is critical in regions such as
the Upper Basin where orographic effects strongly influence precipi-
tation distribution.
The most accurate hydrologic measurements for the basin are
probably the measured streamflow data. Most of the major U.S.
Geological Survey stream gauges in the basin are rated "excellent." '6 2
In evaluating the surface-water resources of the basin it is neces-
sary to try to reconstruct what the virgin flow would be without the
effects of man's activities, primarily diversions and consumptive uses.
The estimation of consumptive uses involves extrapolations and con-
siderable subjective judgment.6 I
Thus it can be seen that there are some uncertainties in the hydro-
logic estimates of available water supply. Because these uncertainties
could be either positive or negative, the figures commonly used
represent best current estimates and could be too optimistic just as
easily as too pessimistic. Hydrologic variation and uncertainty pre-
vents precise projections of water supply. Legal controls and regula-
tions must take these vagaries into account.
B. Projected Demand Curves
To demonstrate the relationship between estimated supply and
projected demand for Colorado River water, Figure 1 depicts the
estimated values for water available for consumptive use in the Upper
Basin and the projected demand curves. The 5.8 m.a.f. level is used as
a conservative guide point by the U.S. Department of the Interior.6 4
61. Rassmussen, Atmospheric Water Balance and Hydrology of the Upper Colorado
River Basin, 6 Water Resources Research 62, 76 (1970).
62. "Excellent" is defined as a station where the recorded flow is judged by the US.
Geological Survey to be within five percent of the real flow 95 percent of the time.
63. Upper Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group, supra note 56, at 11.
64. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 6, at 4:
A Bureau of Reclamation hypothesis indicates that 5.8 m.a.f. should be a
conservative average amount of water available for consumptive use in the
Upper Basin States. Other studies have been made using differing basic
assumptions and applying other factors which have suggested both higher and
lower annual estimates. Recognizing assumptions upon which the Bureau
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FIGURE 1
UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
SURFACE WATER AVAILABLE FOR CONSUMPTIVE USE
COMPACT SHARE 7.5 MAF
ASSUMED AVAILABLE 6.5 MAF
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LPRP ESTIMATE 5.25 MAF
Stippled zone represents most likely level of surface-water supply.
(Modified after Dept. of Interior, Report on Water for Energy in the
Upper Colorado River Basin, 1974)
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The 5.25 m.a.f. level is determined by using the 13.5 m.a.f. average
virgin flow mentioned earlier and subtracting a figure of 8.25 m.a.f.
(7.5 m.a.f. plus one-half of the Mexican obligation, 0.75 m.a.f.) as
the legal downstream obligation. If the Federal Government takes
action to furnish the requirements of the Mexican Treaty from other
sources or through flow augmentation projects, such action will
relieve some of the downstream delivery burden from the Upper
Basin.6 I
If the virgin flow actually averages 13.5 m.a.f. and the Upper Basin
is obligated to deliver downstream an average of 8.25 m.a.f., the total
projected demand will exceed the surface water supply in little more
than a decade.
The figure of 13.5 m.a.f. virgin flow from the Upper Basin will be
used here as a basis for determining the relative pressures within each
state concerning surface-water supply and demand. First, the 10-year
75 m.a.f. obligation to the Lower Basin must be subtracted, a re-
quirement that averages 7.5 m.a.f. per year. Next, until federal action
contributes to the Upper Basin's half of the Mexican Treaty burden,
it will be assumed that an additional 0.75 m.a.f. must be subtracted.
The residual of 5.25 m.a.f. is an estimate of the surface water an-
nually available for consumptive use in the Upper Basin.
Using this figure, Table 2 shows the amount of water from the
Colorado River system available to each Upper Basin state.
TABLE 2
Amount of Water Available to Each Upper Basin State
Percent Acre-feet Per Year
Arizona 6 6  _ 50,000
Colorado 51.75 2,691,000
New Mexico 11.25 585,000
Utah 23.00 1,196,000
Wyoming 14.00 728,000
T OTAL 100.00 5,250,000
Present consumptive use and projected consumptive uses have
been compiled and estimated for each state. 6 'Graphs have been
hypothesis is based, the 5.8 m.a.f. will be used as a guide point in this report
with the recognition that this figure is not supportable by the provisions of the
Compacts and the understanding that its use is not intended in any way as an
interpretation of the Compacts.
65. See 43 U.S.C. § 1512 (1971).
66. Upon the completion of the Navajo Generating Station, Arizona's fixed allocation of
50,000 acre-feet per year for consumptive use of Upper Basin surface water will be essen-
tially depleted. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 6, at 5.
67. See generally id.
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made of these present and future consumptive uses, showing the
supply-demand situation for the four states which receive percentage
shares.
Colorado receives the largest share of Upper Basin water and is
now using most of its share through extensive development within
the basin and transfers of water out of the basin into eastern Colo-
rado. With the flow assumptions discussed above, Figure 2 shows
that Colorado may be in a full depletion position before 1985. The
future requirement of 326,0006 acre-feet per year for energy de-
velopments in progress, planned or projected, food and fiber produc-
tion, and increased extrabasin transfers, will push Colorado's use
beyond the supply level. Most of the expected energy requirements
are related to oil shale development. 69 At the present time, all the
streams constituting the Colorado River system in the State of Colo-
rado are "overappropriated in terms of absolute and conditional
decrees." 7 0
New Mexico, with the smallest allotment of the Upper Basin
states, appears to be in a somewhat worse position. Figure 3 shows
an earlier convergence of demand with the supply curve and an insuf-
ficient supply even with the higher estimated supply levels. There
will be heightened competition for water between projected and
planned energy development and new food and fiber production.
The State of Utah is allotted almost a quarter of the Upper Basin's
share of the water. The development of extensive coal deposits, oil
shale, and tar sands for energy production, the implementation of
Indian claims, and increased extrabasin transfers will constitute the
large increases in use in Utah. In less than two decades, it is likely
that Utah's demand for consumptive use will exceed the available
supply of surface water, as shown in Figure 4.
Utah and Colorado together are allocated almost 75 percent of the
Upper Basin share. Both states have large water- and energy-con-
suming urban centers outside the basin. Also, much of the energy to
be produced in these states will be transmitted not only outside the
basin but outside the respective states. Thus, there will be increasing
68. Id. at 41.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6:
[A] Ithough a stream may be overappropriated by prior decrees, a party can
still obtain a junior adjudicated water right with a current priority date in the
anticipation that it might be used when other senior rights are not utilizing the
full flow of the stream, or if the senior rights are abandoned, etc. This factor
contributes substantially to the fact that most streams in Colorado, including
all those in the Colorado River Basin, are overappropriated in terms of
absolute and conditional decrees.
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FIGURE 2
COLORADO
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FIGURE 3
NEW MEXICO
COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM
SURFACE WATER AVAILABLE FOR CONSUMPTIVE USE
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1990 2000
pressure on the limited water supply of the Upper Basin to provide
water for both export and the production of exportable energy.
Wyoming appears to be under the least stress as far as its allotment
of Upper Basin water is concerned. Even with the level of virgin
runoff estimated by the Lake Powell Research Project and projected
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FIGURE 4
UTAH
COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM
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increases in consumptive use, Figure 5 indicates that there should be
water available for most purposes.
As noted above, the Lower Colorado Basin receives a guaranteed
minimum amount of water from the Upper Basin. This amount is 75
m.a.f. per decade and is divided between the Lower Basin states as
FIGURE 5
WYOMING
COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM
SURFACE WATER AVAILABLE FOR CONSUMPTIVE USE
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follows: Arizona 2.8 m.a.f. per year, California 4.4 m.a.f. per year,
and Nevada 0.3 m.a.f. per year.7 Although in the past more water
flowed into the Lower Basin than was required to meet the legal
commitment, as consumptive use and storage expands in the Upper
Basin, it is likely that the flow will be reduced to the legal minimum.
In Arizona a large amount of current development is based on the
mining of ground water. It is estimated that the annual overdraft of
ground water in the Lower Colorado Region is about 2.5 m.a.f. per
year. 7 2 Most of the overdraft occurs in central Arizona in the Gila
River Basin, a tributary to the Colorado River.7 The Central
Arizona Project water will alleviate some of the stress on ground-
water supplies in the area, but will be inadequate to provide an
annual supply large enough to maintain even the current level of
consumptive use.7 4 Therefore, Arizona is already in a water-deficit
position and only continued mining of ground water will sustain the
current level of use even when the state's full allotment of Colorado
River water is used.
The State of California has been using more than its 4.4 m.a.f.
apportionment7 and will have to reduce the diversions to that level
as other users exercise their rights.
Nevada's allocation is a lesser factor in the Lower Basin water
supply situation, and it can be assumed that the state will use its full
allotment for consumptive use.
The conclusion is that the Lower Basin states are already using or
are constructing facilities to exhaust their legal share of Colorado
River water. With the flow control and storage capabilities of the
Upper Basin now enlarged, that region can be expected to deplete
flows as far as legal requirements will permit.
LEGAL PRESSURE POINTS AMONG THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
As demand for Colorado River water approaches the limit of avail-
able supply, pressures on the existing legal system of allocation and
control can be expected to intensify, and new strains undoubtedly
will develop. Legal problems on the river are partially the function of
changes in the ratio of water supply to water demand, and a rising
71. Lower Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group for the Southwest
Interagency Committee, supra note 51, at 27.
72. l at V-99.
73. Id.
74. Id. at V-101.
75. Some 5.1 m.a.f. were used in California during the 1971 water year according to
Colorado River Board of California, 1971 Annual Report 15-16 (1972).
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water demand curve, although neither absolutely inevitable nor
necessarily desirable, is probable. The consequences of increased
pressures on the legal system will depend, in part, on the nature and
magnitude of the collective responses of the basin states and allied
interests. One response might be for each basin state (possibly pursu-
ant to federal incentives) to adopt and pursue a strategy of maxi-
mizing the utility and economic benefits of available supplies. An
alternative response might be for the basin states to seek both the
augmentation of the river and concomitant substantive alterations in
the legal system of allocation. Although those possible responses are
not mutually exclusive, it should be instructive here to abstract them
separately into two broad "alternative futures," one with and one
without augmentation of flow, in an attempt to identify some of the
legal pressure points.
A. A Future Without Augmented Flow
This alternative future assumes that there will be no augmentation
of flow by importation or weather modification.
Certain general conclusions follow from the hydrological bound-
ary conditions, discussed supra. New uses in many sectors of the
basin can be accommodated only by (1) diminishing or terminating
the flow going to existing uses and (2) salvaging and conserving
water, through improved irrigation practices, reduction in losses from
evaporation and bank storage, or other means. To maintain existing
uses without a reduction in economic production, while at the same
time instituting new uses, slack would have to be found and ex-
ploited in the system. Water would have to be conserved where it has
not been before. The amount of salvage which could be practicably
converted into usable flow determines how much new use could be
accommodated without reducing the net productivity of existing
uses. If salvage practices were not exploited or were exhausted, the
new uses could be instituted only by reducing, terminating, or im-
proving the efficiency of the existing uses.
To the extent that the existing uses are covered by water rights
which are valid as against the new uses, the disturbance of those
existing uses can require the payment of compensation to the exist-
ing user. The existing user would be paid if the water rights were
involuntarily lost or diminished by eminent domain, or voluntarily
sold or leased.
Now let us consider some of the provisions of the law of the river
which would affect or be affected by the above variations on the
theme of scarcity.
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1. The Guaranteed Aggregate Flow Formula
The Upper Basin's obligation to deliver 75 m.a.f. to the Lower
Basin 7 6 (hereafter "G.A.F." for "guaranteed aggregate flow") is very
much alive today. Although other provisions of the 1922 Compact
were never implemented or have been abrogated by federal statutory
and decisional law, the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1963 pronounce-
ment on the subject said it would look to the Compact "to resolve
disputes between the Upper and the Lower Basins .... I
The G.A.F. provision is the source of considerable dissatisfaction
in the Upper Basin. It has caused projections for Upper Basin per
annum beneficial consumptive uses to be limited to 5.8 m.a.f. and
less, as noted earlier. Add to this the fact that the G.A.F. actually
provides the Lower Basin with the opportunity to consume more
than 7.5 m.a.f. per annum from the hydrologic regime of the river.
All of the 7.5 m.a.f. apportioned to the Lower Basin states pursuant
to the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 (as construed in the
1963 Arizona v. California court decision)7 8 originate in the Upper
Basin. The exclusive use of the tributaries in the Lower Basin has
been reserved to each respective state of origin in the Lower Basin.
This means that the Lower Basin experiences some 3 million acre-
feet7 of annual runoff from the hydrologic system of the Colorado
River in addition to the water delivered to it at Lee Ferry under the
compact.
An exhaustion of supply for Upper Basin development in the
future could heighten the Upper Basin's dissatisfaction with the
G.A.F. provision of the Compact. Such an exhaustion could result
from either an increase in depletions through greater development or
a marked reduction in natural supply caused by a dry cycle. The
projected rise in the consumptive use of water for coal-fired power
plants in the Upper Basin, producing electricity in part for the Lower
Basin, will deepen interest in having the G.A.F. formula overhauled.
Even though the Upper Basin will receive some economic benefits
from the construction and operation of the power plants, Upper
Basin interests most likely will argue: Why should we guarantee a
minimum flow to the Lower Basin while permitting part of the
Upper Basin allotment to be translated into electricity which also
goes to the Lower Basin?
Some of the emerging water demand in the Upper Basin, partic-
76. See Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
77. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 567 (1963).
78. Id. at 567-575.
79. Lower Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group, supra note 51, at V-13.
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ularly that associated with the development of coal-fired power
plants and the mining of oil shale, conceivably could be supplied by
undeveloped ground water. There is an intriguing possibility that
sizeable ground-water reserves underlie the coal seams in many of the
structural basins.8 0 The amount available, its recoverability, and its
quality are matters of conjecture at this point, but several million
acre-feet could be involved.8 1 Proposals to use this gradually-replen-
ishable Upper Basin resource, which in most cases is not part of the
"Colorado River system" under the law, to produce power to further
the economic growth of the Lower Basin may further prompt Upper
Basin interests to consider the possibility of obtaining, in exchange, a
greater or more reliable share of the annually replenished surface
waters of the Colorado River system.
2. The Lee Ferry Accounting Point
During the recent Rainbow Bridge litigation,8 2 which threatened
to reduce significantly the storage capacity behind Glen Canyon
Dam, there was unofficial speculation as to the feasibility of moving
the interbasin accounting point downstream from Lee Ferry to the
gates of Hoover Dam in order to provide added holdover storage
within the Upper Basin. The capability of the Upper Basin to meet
the G.A.F. obligation accordingly would be enhanced, reducing the
risk of water shortage for consumptive uses in the Upper Basin.
Moving the accounting point could affect a number of existing
arrangements and regimes, however, including the power generation
contracts and schedules at Hoover Dam and Glen Canyon Dam; the
operation of the Lower and Upper Basin development funds; 8 1 the
crediting of tributary inflows between Lee Ferry and Hoover Dam;
the allocation of Lake Mead evaporation losses; and the recreation
and fishery programs at Lake Mead. Such adjustments probably
could be accomplished technically and legally (through federal legis-
lation) if the political impetus for change existed.
80. Navajo sandstone, which has a high water-holding capacity, deeply underlies much of
the coal-bearing strata in the basin. See, e.g., Goode, Sources of Water to Supply Coal-Fired
Electric Power Plants in Kane County, Utah, 19 Guidebook to the Geology of Utah 144
(Goode & Robinson eds. 1965).
81. See Water Supply Work Group, Southwest Energy Study, Water Supply, Appendix B,
at IIl-11 (February 1972 draft):
Estimated storage of ground water in the Upper Colorado River Basin above a
depth of 100 feet of saturated thickness of aquifers ranges from 50 to 116
million acre-feet. A portion of this is recoverable using available equipment
and methods but without regard to economic, physical, legal, or
environmental factors.
82. Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1171 (1974).
83. See 43 U.S.C. § § 617a, 620d (1971).
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3. Lower Basin Domestic and Irrigation Uses Vs. Upper Basin
Power Production
Hydropower production and irrigated agriculture have been close-
ly linked in federal reclamation policy. Public power has subsidized
irrigation works throughout the Colorado River Basin. Even so, how-
ever, a degree of competition for water between agricultural and
power interests has always existed. The "food vs. energy" debate has
heightened considerably, of course, in recent months.
Electric power was no match for agriculture in the 1922 Compact
negotiations. Power was subordinated to agriculture, reasoned
Herbert Hoover, chairman of the commission which drafted the
Compact:
Because the cultivation of land naturally outranks in importance the
generation of power, since it is the most important of human activ-
ities, the foundation upon which all other industries finally rest. 8 4
There appears to have been an underlying assumption that hydro-
electric generation was the only form of power production which
would use water in the basin.
The 1922 Compact' s exhibits a strong bias in favor of domestic
and agricultural water uses. Article II defines "domestic use" to
"exclude the generation of electrical power." Article 111(e) provides:
The states of the Upper division shall not withhold water, and the
States of the lower division shall not require the delivery of water,
which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural
uses.
Article IV(b) reads, in part, that "water of the Colorado River
System may be impounded and used for the generation of electrical
power, but such impounding and use shall be subservient to the use
and consumption of such water for agricultural and domestic pur-
poses, and shall not interfere with or prevent use for such dominant
purposes." Although a purpose of the Compact as recited in Article I
was "to secure the expeditious, agricultural and industrial develop-
ment of the Colorado River Basin," the electrical power side of
industrialization was of secondary concern.
These Compact provisions raise the issue whether a Lower Basin
agricultural use has preference over an Upper Basin power use. For
example, if and when California is actually limited to 4.4 m.a.f.,
could a California agricultural user, who could not be served within
the 4.4 m.a.f. limit, successfully enjoin the use of water by one or
84. 64 Cong. Rec. 2712 (1923) (statement of Herbert Hoover).
85. Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
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more of the Upper Basin power plants? One commentator has argued
that water can be withheld in the Upper Basin for power use as long
as the G.A.F. obligation is met,8 6 but the issue has not been judi-
cially resolved. The Secretary of the Interior did impose a 10 percent
reduction in Lower Basin water deliveries in 1964 to facilitate the
filling of the reservoir behind Glen Canyon Dam.8 7 Provision was
made for protecting Hoover Dam power contracts and the reduction
in flow was offset by subsequent deliveries to assure compliance with
the G.A.F.
If and when another actual conflict arises over the issue, it could
pit Lower Basin agricultural interests against Lower Basin electric
power interests, since the latter are developing and exporting much
of the electricity generated by coal-fired plants located in the Upper
Basin. Unless the matter were to be legislatively clarified in advance,
the Secretary of the Interior most likely would decide the question,
perhaps precipitating a court test.
4. Restraints on the Transferability of Water Rights
As demand outstrips supply, the pressure for reallocating the
supply by replacing old uses with new uses will increase. The ten-
dency to date has not been to disturb preexisting uses every time a
new demand comes along. Instead, the response has been to find
"physical solutions"-to develop new facilities or supplies for the
new uses.
Many resource economists have expressed the opinion that a freer
market in water rights would produce a more efficient mode of
allocating water 81 than the approach of developing new supplies that
has been traditionally followed in the West. Legal restrictions and
transaction costs have discouraged water-right transfers, however, not
only in the Colorado River Basin but throughout the West.8 9 If the
river system is not augmented, a strong impetus will exist for re-
moving these restraints on alienation.
(a) Federal
Water rights which appertain to land within a federal reclamation
project apparently cannot be transferred without the consent of the
86. Clyde, Conflicts Between the Upper and Lower Basins on the Colorado River, in
Resources Development: Frontiers for Research 113, 126-27 (Western Resources Confer-
ence 1960).
87. See Yuma County Water Users' Ass'n v. Udall, 231 F.Supp. 548 (D.D.C. 1964);
Yuma Mesa Irr. & Drainage Dist. v. Udal, 253 F.Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1966).
88. See generally Hirshleifer, DeHaven & Milliman, Water Supply (1960); Meyers &
Posner, Toward An Improved Market In Water Resources (National Water Comm'n, 1971).
89. See National Water Comm'n, Water Policies for the Future 260-70 (1973).
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Bureau of Reclamation, yet no specific guidelines or incentives exist
for obtaining consent.9 0 The stated reason for the restraint lies in
the government's continuing interest in projects while the users are
repaying construction or rehabilitation loans and, even later, while
the users are paying operation and maintenance charges for the dams
and other government-owned facilities.9 1 Meyers and Posner have
argued the need for legal reform:
Transfers of water from Bureau of Reclamation projects should be
freely permissible, whether or not the transfer is to a different use or
a use outside of the project, subject only to the conditions that the
purchaser assume so much of the construction loan as is fairly allo-
cable to the quantity of water transferred and that he assume a
portion of 0 & M charges if the transfer diminishes the ability of the
seller to continue to pay all of them. The Bureau would be em-
powered to intervene in any transfer proceeding to protect its
interests. 9 2
The uncertain state of affairs at the federal level increases the trans-
action costs associated with purchasing an irrigation water right.
(b) Interregional and Interstate
The existing allocation scheme for the Colorado River discourages
interbasin and interstate water right transfers. Both before and after
the beneficial consumptive use was allocated first to the Upper and
Lower Basins and later to the respective states, private water rights
appertaining to specific locations and uses became recognized under
state law. The extent to which the transfer of such rights would be
given extrajurisdictional effect is problematic. Assume, for example,
that an agricultural user holds a valid water right in State X which he
wants to sell to a power user in State Y. Would that water right be
recognized and enforceable in State Y? Against which state's entitle-
ment would the use be charged?
Unreasonable state law restraints on interstate commerce in water
are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.9 ' But does the
Constitution compel that one state or region recognize the transfer,
change of use and change in point of diversion, of a water right
90. See Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy,
64 Mich. L.Rev. 13 (1965); Meyers & Posner, supra note 88, at 18-25.
91. Meyers & Posner, supra note 88, at 22.
92. Id. at 47. 43 U.S.C. § § 485h(c) & 521 (1971) provide some authority for transfers.
See El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp. 894,
920-21 (W.D. Tex. 1955), aff'd as reformed, 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 820 (1957).
93. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd mem., 385 U.S.
35 (1966).
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which is otherwise valid in another state? Arguably not, unless some
federal program for legitimating and regulating such exchanges is
established. Since water uses are charged against the entitlement of
the state and basin in which the use occurs, a transfer of use from
one state to another, or one basin to another, could affect the
balance of "political equities" between the states. Adjustments in the
state entitlements, a system of credits or some other means might
have to be devised to deal with the problem.
(c) Intrastate
Legal requirements and uncertainties in the laws of some of the
basin states discourage the intrastate transfer of water and water
rights.9" Many of the legal constraints against transfers stem from
the historic notion that a water right is appurtenant to the land on
which the water is originally used. Changes in use and in points of
diversion are commonly allowed in most western states. Perhaps the
next development will be a uniform rule among the states that water
rights can be severed from the land, and exercised and recognized
elsewhere.9 " The pressure which has been building to change the
state laws restricting transfer could be expected to increase appre-
ciably under a future of unaugmented flow.
5. Federal and Indian Water Rights Quantified and Exercised
Federal and Indian water rights will be particularly important
variables in the management of unaugmented flow. New energy uses
in the Upper Basin are occurring against the backdrop of unquan-
tified federal and Indian water rights which, when quantified and
exercised, could displace existing lower-priority uses in times of
scarcity.9 6
Energy-related developmental interests, demanding a reliable water
supply for billion-dollar investments, can be expected to seek the
consent of Indian tribes to shortage-sharing arrangements wherein
the tribes would surrender, for a period of years or permanently,
their early priority dates and agree to share water in time of scarcity
in return for some form of consideration.9 Interest will also be
94. See, e.g., Meyers & Posner, supra note 88, at Appendix I.
95. Meyers & Posner, supra note 88, at 47-49, listed the major elements for a "Model
State Transfer of Water Rights Act."
96. At this writing serious consideration is being given to the introduction of legislative
proposals in Congress which would adjudicate or otherwise quantify reserved water rights.
See recommendation for a "National Water Rights Procedures Act" and Indian water rights
act in National Water Comm'n, supra note 89, at 463-67 and 477-83.
97. Such a trade-off marked the development of the San Juan-Chama Project. See 43
U.S.C. § 615ss (1971).
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displayed in leasing or acquiring Indian water rights, posing the legal
issues, yet unresolved, whether the Indian right can be leased or
transferred for off-reservation use. 9 " By executing waivers of rights
for a period of years, the tribal holders of unquantified water rights
can obtain some interim financial return, but only at the consider-
able risk of allowing additional Anglo uses to accumulate and de-
velop patterns of economic reliance which subsequently are difficult
to disturb.
While Indian water rights may be periodically waived for value in
direct bargaining between the tribes and Anglo users, the Federal
Government, as trustee of the tribal resources, cannot legitimately
permit Indian water rights to be compromised, whether in a spirit of
accommodation or otherwise. The basin is not simply a mixing bowl
in which all interests are equally mitigated and compromised. Some
rights and obligations are intended to be fully satisfied without re-
gard to the claims of competing interests. Indian water rights are not
subject to being prorationed downward through some kind of "judg-
ment call." 9
Several legal issues could arise under competitive conditions. Is a
certain minimum water quality standard to be implied in the Indian
water right? Is the formula for dividing water between the basins a
limit on Indian water rights? Are the various ceilings on the entitle-
ments of the respective states also effective ceilings on the water
rights of Indian tribes located in those states?
As already noted, neither the 1922 Compact, nor the 1948
Compact, purports to affect Indian water rights."' Indian water
uses within each basin state are charged against that state's entitle-
ment, according to Arizona v. California" I (as to the Lower Basin)
and the 1948 Compact' 02 (as to the Upper Basin), but this does not
resolve the question whether Indian uses or rights are limited by
those state entitlements. To take a remote example, assume that
State X is entitled by Compact to 10 units of water. Anglo user A
has a year 1900 priority right to the first 5 units. Tribal user B has
the next priority right (year 1905) which, measured in terms of the
purposes for which the reservation was created, amounts to 6 units.
Can Tribe B use the full 6 units, to the detriment of a junior user
(year 1910) in downstream State Y? There is an administrative
98. See Comment, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 Mont.L.Rev. 266 (1972).
99. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.Supp. 252, 259 (D.D.C.
1973).
100. See note 36, supra.
101. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
102. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. VII, 63 Stat. 31, 35 (1949).
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ruling, which has not been judicially confirmed, to the effect that the
Navajo Tribe is limited by the 50,000 acre-feet Upper Basin entitle-
ment of the State of Arizona, notwithstanding the fact that the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact disclaims any effect on Indian
rights.' 0 3 The claims recognized on behalf of the lower Colorado
River tribes in Arizona v. California' 04 did not exceed the entitle-
ments of the affected states, therefore these issues were not treated.
Since new energy demands predictably will impinge upon some
historic, but unexercised, federal and Indian water claims, pressures
will mount to resolve some of the foregoing issues.
6. Impact of Water Quality Standards
An unthinking assumption is sometimes made that man has only
worsened, never improved, the water quality of the Colorado River.
In fact, of course, human activities variously have upgraded and
degraded the quality of the surface flow. The river has always been
heavily laden with silt. Even now, more than half of the total load of
dissolved solids in the river originate from salt springs and diffuse
runoff." 0I Although evaporation from reservoirs can concentrate
salt, dams and desilting facilities have improved in many ways the
quality of the water for numerous consumptive uses. But consump-
tive uses, in turn, have deteriorated the artificially-achieved water
quality. Depletions without return flows have reduced the dilutive
capacity of the downstream flow. Depletions with return flows have
contributed concentrated dissolved solids to the downstream flow.
The utility of the river has been exploited with very little regard to
103. Sol.Op. M-36799, 76 Interior Dec. 357 (December 10, 1969). The opinion is based,
in part, on the disputable premise that the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact "flatly
precludes total use [including Indian use] of Upper Basin, water in Arizona in excess of
50,000 acre-feet a year." Id. at 358. Another interpretation of the Compact, however, is
that it left Indian water rights wholly unaffected. See, e.g., Upper Colorado River Comm'n,
Official Record of Meeting No. 7 at 13 (mimeo, July 7, 1948) (comments of Commissioner
Stone). If so, then it would be quite possible that an Indian water right, when exercised,
could be chargeable against a state's entitlement but not limited by that entitlement. The
issue has been posed as follows by Muys, Interstate Water Compacts: The Interstate Com-
pact and Federal-Interstate Compact 285 (National Water Comm'n 1971):
What is the effect of the Indian rights disclaimer if a compact apportionment
is inadequate to satisfy all Indian water rights? Does the preservation of the
obligation of the United States to the Indian tribes mean that the compact
apportionment is controlling but the United States owes an obligation to make
the Indian tribes whole if their rights are curtailed by the compact ceilings? Or
does it mean that the actual uses are to be unimpaired by the compact appor-
tionments?
104. 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
105. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Mineral Quality Problem in the
Colorado River Basin-Summary Report 18 (1971). Of course, man's activities have aggra-
vated the pollution from diffuse runoff in many areas.
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the progressive deterioration of water quality. Rights to use the
water have been perfected or reserved, but no minimum flow for
purposes of water quality has been preserved. Concern for water
quality has been voiced from time to time by opponents of particular
development projects,' 06 but it has not prevented, nor even signif-
icantly impaired, development.
The issue of salinity was tacitly avoided in the negotiations behind
the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944.' ' 7 A national obligation to
improve the quality of the water flowing to Mexico has been recog-
nized and will be pursued through the new Colorado River Salinity
Control Act of 1974' 08 by desalting irrigation return flows and
controlling natural and man-caused salt sources. The salinity-control
projects authorized and envisioned by the 1974 Act should reduce
the proportion of dissolved solids in the water used in the Lower
Basin, but whether these planned physical solutions can improve
water quality to a point where expected numerical salinity standards
can be met remains to be seen.
The adoption of receiving-water standards for interstate streams
was required by the Federal Water Quality Act of 1965. 109 The
basin states' failure to promulgate salinity standards in a timely
fashion gave rise to an enforcement conference, conducted by the
Environmental Protection Agency in 1972,' ' 0 which produced a
memorandum of understanding that supported the construction of
salt-control projects.' ' '
In October of 1972, however, Congress enacted the more stringent
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. .2 which, among
other things, adopt the "national goal that the discharge of pollu-
tants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."' ' Since the
Act is directed primarily at limiting effluents from point sources,' 1 14
most non-point return flows will probably escape its permit pro-
106. For example, California interests invoked water quality arguments in opposing
authorization of the Colorado River Storage Project. See Hearings on H.R. 270, H.R. 2836,
H.R. 3383, H.R. 3384, and H.R. 4488 before the Subcomm. on Irrigation & Reclamation of
the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 911 (1955).
107. See note 16 supra.
108. Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974).
109. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965), amending 33 U.S.C. § § 1151-1174
(1964).
110. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Seventh Enforcement Conference in the
Matter of Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the Colorado River and Its Tributaries (Las
Vegas, February 15-17, 1972 and Denver, April 26-27, 1972).
111. See Transcript of Conference, id. at 169-173 (April 27, 1972); also, U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program (1972).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1971).
113. Id. § 2.
114. Id.
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cedures. Irrigation return flows from more than 3,000 contiguous
acres are being treated as point sources, however.1 I The Act re-
quires the adoption of adequate receiving-water standards and imple-
mentation plans, which will also have an effect on the Colorado
River.
The EPA has set up a schedule which requires the basin states, by
October of 1975, to adopt numerical salinity standards for the
Colorado River and a plan for implementing the standards by July of
1983.1 1 6 It is expected that the Colorado River Salinity Control
Forum, composed of representatives of the basin states, will propose
a numerical standard and plan by February of 1975.' 1 7
The imposition of water quality standards on an unaugmented
flow can be expected to highlight the manmade sources of pollution,
such as irrigated agriculture. If the projects under the 1974 Salinity
Control Act do not bring the river into conformance, further
remedial action will be required. It is not likely that any single state,
or the states in concert, will act to impose restrictions on water use
absent the federal carrot or stick. The carrot has been-and probably
will continue for some time to be-favored over the stick.1 1 I Future
federal funding on the river can be expected to be conditioned on
the adoption of improved water-use practices by the beneficiaries.
Each of the basin states might attempt to impose restrictions on
the exercise of water rights which would encourage wiser irrigation
practices. The states ought to redefine the standard of "beneficial
use" to require adoption of available technical methods of reducing
effluent in return flows.' 1 9 If such regulation exceeds the police
power of the state, the power of eminent domain could be exercised
to reduce significant sources of return-flow effluent.
B. A Future With Augmented Flow
Weather modification2 0 and transbasin water importation are
115. 40 C.F.R. § 124.11(h)(4)(1974).
116. See, e.g., letter from John A. Green, Regional Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region VIII, to Hon. John A. Love, Governor of Colorado, January 18,
1973.
117. Interview with Robert H. Hagen, Chief, Land Planning Section, Environmental
Protection Agency, Region VIII, in Denver, Colorado, September 4, 1974.
118. The "distributive" mode of water policy concerning the Colorado River is discussed
by Mann, The Politics of Water Resource Development in the Upper Colorado River Basin,
in D. Mann, G. Weatherford & Nichols, Legal-Political History of Water Resource Develop-
ment in the Upper Colorado River Basin (Lake Powell Research Project, 1974).
119. Colorado recently redefined "beneficial use" to include the appropriation "of such
minimum flows... as are required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable
degree." Laws of Colo. 1973, ch. 442, § 1.
120. See generally Fleagle, Crutchfield, Johnson & Abdo, Weather Modification in the
Public Interest (1974).
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means by which the flow of the Colorado River could be augmented.
The Bureau of Reclamation has reported that weather modification
over the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains could generate
approximately 0.9 to 1.3 m.a.f. of additional flow annually for the
system. I 1 With the 1978 end of the 10-year moratorium on recon-
naissance studies for the transbasin augmentation of water,' 2 2
interest may be revived in schemes to import water into the basin
from the Pacific Northwest, British Columbia, or Alaska.' 2 3
1. Effect of Existing Law Upon Augmentation Plans
It is almost certain that the allocation of such additional flow,
whatever its source, would be determined-at least in broad terms-
by the federal legislation authorizing the expenditure of funds for
the particular augmentation program. Predictably, the preexisting
law of the river would be reviewed, tested and modified in the legis-
lative process leading up to such an enactment.
(a) National Environmental Policy Act
Without question, any plan to augment appreciably the flow of
the river would constitute a "major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment" within the meaning
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).'24 One
or more environmental impact statements would have to be pre-
pared, identifying among other things adverse impacts and program
alternatives.
(b) Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972,' 12 discussed supra, could influence the
apportionment of the augmented flow. If the unaugmented flow
violates numerical water quality standards at the time augmentation
is planned, the Environmental Protection Agency might be expected
to suggest to Congress that a portion of the new flow be apportioned
to raising the minimum dilutive flow of the river to effect compli-
ance with the standards.
121. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, supra note 6, at 58.
122. See 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (1971).
123. See D. Mann, Interbasin Water Transfers: A Political and Institutional Analysis
(Nat'l Technical Information Serv., Acc. No. PB208303, 1972).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1971).
125. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1971).
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(c) Colorado River Project Act of 1968
Deficit apportionment in anticipation of augmented flow has
already occurred. Statutory and contractual preferences have already
been established for a part of any future augmented flow. Section
202 of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968126 declares
that "the satisfaction of the requirements of the Mexican Water
Treaty from the Colorado River constitutes a national obligation
which shall be the first obligation of any water augmentation proj-
ect" built pursuant to a general water-supply and water-demand plan
for the Western United States.
Once certain levels of augmented flow are reached, however, some
existing limitations and priorities will be lifted. The obligation to
meet the Mexican Treaty obligation from the unaugmented flow of
the Colorado River will cease with the development of 2.5 m.a.f. of
annual augmented flow.1 27 And the priority which certain existing
Lower Basin uses have over the Central Arizona Project
shall not apply so long as the Secretary [of the Interior] shall deter-
mine and proclaim that means are available and in operation which
augment the water supply of the Colorado River system in such
quantity as to make sufficient mainstream water available for release
to satisfy annual consumptive use of seven million five hundred
thousand acre-feet in Arizona, California, and Nevada.1 28
With specific reference to any transbasin importation scheme, the
1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act requires that the exporting
region be protected by federal funds and by recognition of a perpet-
ual right to first call on the exported water.1 2 9
(d) 1922 Compact and 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act
The issue may arise whether certain provisions of the 1922
Compact, unless otherwise modified or superseded by subsequent
laws, would govern the apportionment of augmented flow.
Article III(b), for example, purports to give the Lower Basin the
right "to increase its beneficial consumptive use" of the waters of the
Colorado River system "by 1,000,000 acre-feet per annum," over
and above the 7.5 m.a.f. recognized in Article 111(a). The "Colorado
River System" is defined in Article 11(a) as "that portion of the
Colorado River and its tributaries within the United States of
America." Water imported from another basin would not be part of
the system as it exists in a state of nature. Artificially generated
126. 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1971).
127. Id. § 202.
128. Id. § 301.
129. Id. § 203.
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precipitation, which drains naturally into the river and tributaries,
presents a closer case, but it too probably does not come within the
legal definition of the system.
The Upper Basin might argue that any annual augmentation ought
to inure exclusively or predominantly to its benefit to balance out
the inequities created by the combined workings of low historic flow
and the G.A.F. formula, referred to earlier. The augmented flow
would permit the Upper Basin to enjoy a fuller portion of "the
exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water
per annum" perpetually apportioned to it in Article 111(a) of the
1922 Compact.
The 1922 Compact contains a mechanism for the "equitable
apportionment" of beneficial uses left unapportioned by the
document. According to subparagraphs (f) and (g) of Article III, "at
any time after October 1, 1963, if and when either basin shall have
reached its total beneficial consumptive use" [7.5 m.a.f. in Upper,
8.5 m.a.f. in Lower Basin], any two signatory states can cause the
President of the United States and the governors of all of the signa-
tory states to appoint representatives "whose duty it shall be to
divide and apportion equitably between the upper basin and the
lower basin the beneficial use of the unapportioned water," subject
to state and federal legislative ratification. It is doubtful that this
provision would govern any attempt at apportioning augmented
flow.
First, there is the bootstrap problem. Barring a lengthy and extra-
ordinary wet water cycle, it is not likely that either basin could reach
the compact limits on beneficial consumptive use. Second, as already
noted, it is doubtful whether the augmented flow would be part of
the "system" for which such further equitable apportionment would
be intended.
Whatever the proper interpretation of Article 111(f) and (g),
nothing would prohibit the basin states, with congressional consent,
from convening a round of negotiations looking toward a new inter-
state agreement.
2. Conflicts Over Measuring Use and Charging Losses
Augmentation might give rise to a conflict between the Upper and
Lower Basins stemming from the legal uncertainty surrounding the
definition of "beneficial consumptive use." '1 I The Upper Basin and
Lower Basin measure beneficial consumptive use differently. The
Upper Basin Compact adopts the "inflow-outflow" method with its
130. Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
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"net depletion" formula which "does not charge users for water they
apply to beneficial use if the water would have been lost anyway in a
state of nature." 1"1 The Lower Basin is governed by a formula
which regards beneficial consumptive use as the difference between
diversions and return flows. 32 If and when Upper Basin consump-
tive use ever reached 7.5 m.a.f. under the Lower Basin method of
measurement, the Lower Basin might be heard to complain if there
were an increase in the use pursuant to the "inflow-outflow"
formula.
3. Indian and Federal Reserved Rights
Although reserved water rights are commonly regarded as attach-
ing to flow from runoff within the watershed of use, rather than to
artificially augmented flow, the distinction might not be meaningful
in the practical context within which augmentation plans could be
expected to evolve. If, for example, the assertion of reserved water
rights threatened to deprive existing Anglo users of water, augmented
water supplies most likely would be viewed as a means of mitigating
the competition.
An interesting point-counterpoint between law and politics could
arise in such circumstances. On the one hand, the national obligation
to the Indian tribes would provide the basin states an appealing
touchstone with which to seek broad political support for a largely
nonreimburseable river augmentation project. On the other hand, if
the Indian tribes accepted rights in the augmented flow, in lieu of
reserved rights, they could be giving up the early priority dates of
their water rights. Arguably, then, the lower priority users of the
unaugmented flow ought to be the ones subordinated to the prior-
ities of the exporting region (in the case of water importation) or to
the fortuities of governmental rainmaking (in the case of weather
modification).
LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: PROSPECTS AND PATTERNS
A. The Legal-Political Environment for Change
1. The Federal Presence
The adaptability of the law of the river lies in the paramount fact
of federal control. The strongest legal influence on the river is the
United States Constitution, granting the President the power to make
treaties 1 3 3 and empowering Congress to regulate interstate and
131. Meyers, supra note 13, at 19.
132. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
133. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
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foreign commerce,1 34 administer public lands,' ' ' protect the
Native American,"'6 and provide for the general welfare.' 1 7 The
basin states sought unsuccessfully to put the river system outside the
reach of the commerce clause by declaring the river to be nonnav-
igable.' 38 Congress and the United States Supreme Court have
insisted on the Colorado River's navigability' 9 in order to preserve
federal control over its development.
The construction, subsidization, and operation of the dams and
associated works unquestionably has given the Federal Government
administrative control of the river. The Secretary of the Interior
currently is the regent of the water resources-and a major portion of
the land and mineral resources' 0-of the Colorado River Basin.
The Secretary acts amidst many restraints, however, and the author-
ity he wields is delegated by Congress. The pressures for institutional
change may originate elsewhere, but little significant institutional
change is likely to occur without authorization from Congress.
Federal powers are sufficient to promote and oversee needed
changes in the water allocation and management system. Water
quality improvement is becoming federally regulated and subsidized.
Federal and state restraints on water right transfers could be mod-
ified, with water allocation becoming a matter of interstate com-
merce within the basin.
The central issue becomes, then, not whether the legal framework
of the river is flexible enough to facilitate change, but rather how the
change will be accomplished. Put another way, the question is not
whether federal authority is sufficient to manage change, but rather
how that authority will be exercised and who will pay the costs and
enjoy the benefits of the resultant change.
2. The Role of the States
Although the Federal Government enjoys supremacy over the
basin states in most areas of sovereignty and political power under
the Constitution, federal powers over water and other natural re-
sources in the West generally are exercised on behalf of articulated
134. Id. art. I, § 8.
135. Id. art. IV, § 3.
136. Id. art. I, § 8.
137. Id.
138. See Colorado River Compact, art. IV(a), 70 Cong. Rec. at 325.
139. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 617, 617e (1971); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423,
453-55 (1931).
140. See Lower Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group, supra note 51, at
Appendix VI-49, and Upper Colorado Region State-Federal Interagency Group, supra note
56, at Appendix VI-14.
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state interests. The final political action may be federal, but, in any
given case, the impetus for taking the action can originate with the
states, or at least with a coalition of interests in which the states play
a major role. The states will be principal participants in any signif-
icant institutional changes which occur.
3. The Changing Missions and Constituencies of the Federal and
State Agencies
Changes in water use patterns will mean changes in the com-
plexion of the user-beneficiaries served by federal and state water
management agencies. The missions and actions of those agencies will
be influenced over time by the expectations and demands of newly
defined constituencies.
Federal and state water agencies have found it necessary in recent
years to make changes in program goals and procedures. For
example, rising environmental concern, represented by the 1969
enactment and ongoing implementation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, has imposed the values of environmental interest
groups upon all federal agencies engaged in resource management,
including the Bureau of Reclamation. Counterpart state legislation
has had similar effect on the water agencies of some of the basin
states. Environmental analysts have been added to agency staffs and
environmental analysis has been added as a step in project planning.
Alliances within the new sectors of water consumers can be ex-
pected to develop. Electric power producers will cooperate to attain
a stronger and more unified voice in water management affairs in the
basin. The Indian tribes will likely find advantage in establishing a
region-wide tribal water commission or in obtaining threshold or
expanded representation in Anglo-dominated water resource plan-
ning efforts. State boards and commissions gradually will be restruc-
tured to allow new water users to be represented.
B. The Quest for Regional Management
1. The Persistent Pluralism
The competition surrounding the exploitation and conservation of
the natural resources, including the water, of the Colorado River
Basin is too intense to allow prompt and easy systematic changes in
the water management system. The diversity of values, interests, and
jurisdictions operating in the basin hamper the establishment of some
form of regional government to comprehensively plan and manage
the publicly-owned, and regulate the privately-owned, natural re-
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sources." 41 Conceivably, however, the advent of large-scale mineral
and energy development may put enough of a competitive strain on
the use of basin land, water, and air to create a favorable climate for
certain kinds of institutional change.
2. Expanded Regulatory Mechanisms for Resolving Conflict and
Mitigating Competition
Multiple-use management involves the continuous balancing of
competing interests. As the pressure on the natural resources of the
basin increases, the situations in which competitors take nonnego-
tiable positions and refuse to accede to agency attempts at com-
promise solutions will increase.
In the short term this will mean that dissatisfied interests will
engage in more contests at the administrative hearing level, and will
seek judicial review of agency decisions and judicial restraint of
agency actions. It is unclear whether this change will simply involve
the greater use of existing agency machinery or will prompt the
creation of new regulatory agencies or procedures. There currently is
pending, for example, the issue whether the Federal Power Commis-
sion has jurisdiction over power plants which use Colorado River
water for cooling purposes.' 4 2
3. Institutional Arrangements for Regional Planning
If the comprehensive and coordinated management of the natural
resources and environment of the Basin is a distant prospect, new
ventures into basin-wide planning' 4 1 could be made in the near
future. Either land planning or water-resource planning could provide
the needed focus or impetus. Political realities counsel that signifi-
cant steps toward such basin-wide planning will not be taken without
the cooperation of all of the involved states and that the states will
cooperate only if there are economic and political incentives to do
SO.
Some sources of legal authority may already exist for providing
such incentives. The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments
of 1972 authorize the creation of interstate waste treatment manage-
ment planning areas, sanction planning administration grants to the
141. See Weatherford, Basin-Wide Planning and the Problem of Multiple Jurisdictions in
the Colorado River Basin, in Colorado River Basin Environmental Management (D. Peterson
& B. Crawford eds., publication pending).
142. Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S.
944 (1974).
143. The closest approximation to basinwide multiple-resource planning seen to date are
the Type I framework studies, notes 51 & 56 supra.
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states, encourage uniformity of state laws, and consent to interstate
water quality compacts.1"' The Water Resources Planning Act of
1965145 authorizes the creation of river basin (and related land
resources) commissions, but requires concurrence by "at least three
of the four states Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming," for
the creation of such a commission in the Upper Colorado River
Basin.' 46
Generally speaking, three institutional models exist for interstate
water planning: (1) river basin coordinating committees or commis-
sions, (2) interstate and federal-interstate compact commissions and
(3) regional government corporations." I A critical review of how
such arrangements have operated elsewhere ought to be undertaken
with a view toward identifying workable institutional alternatives
available to the Colorado River Basin.
4. Regional Water Development and Exchange Account
Consideration might be given to including some type of regional
water rights exchange mechanism within future institutional arrange-
ments. As already noted, there currently are restrictions on the intra-
state and interstate transfer of water rights. The political equity of
each state in the Colorado River Basin is secured by a certain share of
the usable flow. The right to the water is a necessary condition
precedent to economic development. The apportionment of the
beneficial use of the Colorado River to the states was an allocation of
an economic growth factor which the states vigorously protect for
their citizenry.
Could the political and economic interest of a basin state in its
water apportionment be protected, on the one hand, and the inter-
state transfer of the right to use water be permitted, on the other?
Obvious problems exist. Even if the right to use water could be
leased between users in different states for a period of years, provid-
ing income to the lessor while allowing the underlying water right to
remain within the original state's apportionment, the state of origin
might not enjoy indirectly the same multiplier effect from the lease
income that it would enjoy from the productive water-use activity
itself.
One approach might be to set up a regional accounting mechanism
which would allow a state's interest in water of the Colorado River
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (1971).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (1971).
146. Id. § 1962b(a).
147. See description of existing river basin institutions in National Water Comm'n, supra
note 89, at 414-33.
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system to be translated into economic development credits or funds;
that is, in return for the permanent or periodic relinquishment of a
water right, a state could receive other benefits, such as economic
development moneys, to offset the loss of economic activity arising
from the water use. Such an idea requires the attention first and
foremost of economists, not lawyers and hydrologists, so it will not
be pursued further here.
CONCLUSION
The "law of the river" is neither static nor seamless; rather, it is a
changing patchwork of provisions born of a series of events and
experiences. While it protects a number of historical and vested in-
terests, it is not dependent upon any one of them for ultimate sur-
vival. Vestigial legal priorities and provisions can be sloughed off, at a
price, as new ones are taken on. The entire legal framework need not
be-nor is it likely to be-scrapped simply because new demands for
water are being articulated by strong economic forces.
The scale of dislocation and change expected over the coming
decades can be handled by the legal system through water conserva-
tion and the acquisition or condemnation of water rights. It will not
be an easy road. Legal priorities will need to shift over time to
accommodate the competing demands. Vested rights will be subject
to increased regulation, and in some instances to condemnation, to
effect the needed changes.
The Colorado River will continue to be subject to the ephemeral
preferences and programs of a pluralistic society. As long as capital
investment requires security, some proprietary or contractual assur-
ance of long-term water supply will be necessary. As long as the flow
of the river is variable, a legal formula for allocating hydrological
risk will be required. As long as the quality of the river significantly
limits economic development, legally enforceable standards for water
use practices will be needed.
In broad terms, the problem of managing the Colorado River is the
problem of allocating a flow resource in such a way as to satisfy
legally preferred current demands without foreclosing the satisfac-
tion of a different set or configuration of demands in the future.
When so viewed, it is clear that there will be no single and final
solution to the problems of allocation and management in the Colo-
rado River Basin. The time for seriously addressing the emerging
generation of problems, however, is now.
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